methodology-selector
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 30, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests untrusted user data and is instructed to copy it into an output contract used by downstream processes.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads user-supplied fields including "Task", "Audience", "Context", "Output format", "Validation", and "Human review / stop" as specified in
SKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The output is encapsulated in a structured YAML block, providing a clear schema-based boundary.
- Capability inventory: The resulting methodology contract is intended to be consumed by a downstream "goal-engineering" process that may have broader execution capabilities.
- Sanitization: No sanitization or filtering is performed; the instructions explicitly require the agent to "copy the six input fields faithfully."
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
SKILL.mdfile contains instructions for the agent to execute a local JavaScript file for fixture validation:node /absolute/path/to/methodology-selector/scripts/self-test.mjs. The script itself performs integrity checks on the skill's manifest and references. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Reference files such as
references/aida.mdandreferences/decision-matrix.mdcontain URL references to an external domain:https://loopengineering.app/methodology-skill-generator/.
Audit Metadata