why
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 29, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes local shell commands to establish historical context for its investigation.
- Evidence:
SKILL.md(Step 2) andreferences/sources/code-archaeology.mdspecify the use ofgit blame,git log, and the GitHub CLI (gh pr view) to extract commit history, PR bodies, and discussion threads. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests large volumes of untrusted, externally-sourced data which could contain malicious instructions designed to subvert the agent's logic during synthesis.
- Ingestion points: External data is fetched from diverse sources including GitHub PR comments, Linear issue descriptions, Notion documentation, Slack chat threads, and Datadog/Sentry logs.
- Boundary markers: The
investigator-prompt.mdandsynthesizer-prompt.mdfiles establish clear roles and instruct investigators to "Gather, don't conclude" and "Quote verbatim," providing some logical separation between source data and agent instructions. - Capability inventory: The skill has significant capabilities, including the ability to spawn child agents (
delegate_task), execute git/gh commands, and interact with numerous third-party MCP tools for database and API access. - Sanitization: There is no explicit sanitization, filtering, or escaping of retrieved external text (such as PR comments or chat messages) before it is processed by the synthesizer sub-agent.
Audit Metadata