herdr-pair
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 17, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamically generates and executes Python scripts and shell commands to manage session state and inter-agent communication.
- Evidence: In
SKILL.md, the 'Sending (with verify)' section uses a Python heredoc (`python3 - ... <<'PY'`) to perform atomic JSON updates to a session file.
- Evidence: Uses the
herdrCLI to perform sensitive operations such aspane run(spawning new processes),pane send-text(injecting content into other panes), andpane send-keys(simulating keyboard input like 'Enter'). - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it automatically triggers and processes instructions based on specific patterns detected in the terminal output.
- Ingestion points: The skill monitors agent terminal input for a header prefix
[agent <name> -> <name> ...]as defined in theSKILL.mdfrontmatter and 'Receiving' section. - Boundary markers: The protocol uses a structured header but does not include explicit instructions to ignore or sanitize potentially malicious instructions embedded within the message body.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes the
herdrCLI (split, run, send-text, send-keys, read) and performs file writes to~/.herdr-coworkers/for state management. - Sanitization: The 'Receiving' logic in
SKILL.mdvalidates the session ID (sid) and workspace ID against a local JSON file, which mitigates some session hijacking risks but not the content injection itself.
Audit Metadata