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Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 19, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests unresolved PR comments from GitHub, which are external inputs that could be controlled by unauthorized or malicious actors commenting on a repository.
- Ingestion points: Fetches PR review comments and top-level summaries using
gh api graphqlandgh pr view. - Boundary markers: The skill does not define specific delimiters (like XML tags or markdown blocks) to isolate comment text from instructions, increasing the risk that instructions embedded in a comment might be interpreted by the agent.
- Capability inventory: The agent can read local files (
path:line), execute shell commands via theghCLI, and trigger subsequent automated workflows using thetddskill. - Sanitization: There is no explicit instruction to sanitize, escape, or ignore instructions within the fetched comment bodies.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on executing the
gh(GitHub CLI) to perform its core functions. - Evidence: Uses
gh api graphqlto fetch thread data andgh pr viewto inspect PR state. While these are legitimate tools for the skill's purpose, they represent a capability to interact with the environment and network.
Audit Metadata