worktree-workflow
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 18, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes the
wt,git, andghcommand-line interfaces. Security is maintained through mandatory user confirmation steps before the agent performs merges, pushes, or configuration updates. It specifically prohibits the use of 'force' or 'auto-approve' flags unless explicitly requested by the user. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has an ingestion surface for untrusted data by deriving automation hooks from project files such as
package.json,Makefile,pyproject.toml, orCargo.toml. - Ingestion points:
package.json,Makefile,pyproject.toml,Cargo.toml(detected in SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: Absent (instructions rely on LLM interpretation).
- Capability inventory: Shell command execution via
wthooks and standard CLI tools. - Sanitization: Absent, but the risk is mitigated by instructing the agent to explain proposed commands and requiring manual user approval (
wt config approvals add) before execution. - [SAFE]: The skill incorporates defensive instructions, such as avoiding hardcoded paths by using tool-provided metadata and ensuring that checks/tests are run before any code is proposed for merging.
Audit Metadata