fair-simulation-packager
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 22, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
fair_packager.pyscript allows writing the generated manifest to an arbitrary file path via the--outargument. The implementation does not restrict the output path to the working directory and explicitly allows absolute paths and directory traversal (..). This provides a capability to overwrite sensitive user or system files (e.g.,.bashrc,.ssh/config) with JSON content if the agent is misled or compromised. - Evidence:
scripts/fair_packager.pylines 147-150:out_path = Path(args.out); _reject_control(str(out_path), 'out'); out_path.write_text(json.dumps(manifest, indent=2, sort_keys=True) + '\n', encoding='utf-8'). - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted user input and file system metadata, which are subsequently returned to the agent in a structured JSON envelope. This creates a surface where malicious data could influence downstream agent logic.
- Ingestion points: Command-line arguments (
--project-name,--engine,--units, etc.) and file paths passed to the script inscripts/fair_packager.py. - Boundary markers: Data is encapsulated in a JSON object with specific keys (
inputs,results.manifest), providing clear structural boundaries. - Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to read file metadata (existence, size, SHA256) and write a single JSON file to an arbitrary path via
out_path.write_textinscripts/fair_packager.py. - Sanitization: The script implements basic sanitization by rejecting control characters (
_reject_control) and enforcing an allowlist for unit keys and values (SAFE_FIELD).
Audit Metadata