skill-evaluator
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 22, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
subprocess.runto drive multiple coding agent CLIs (e.g.,claude,codex,agy,cursor-agent,copilot,amp,opencode,grok) in headless mode. It explicitly uses flags like--dangerously-skip-permissions,--dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandbox, and--always-approveto enable automated tool use without interactive confirmation. This bypasses typical agent safety prompts, though it is documented as a requirement for non-interactive evaluation. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The
scripts/run_script_checks.pyscript executes Python files found within the directory of the skill being evaluated. While this is a core functionality for verifying deterministic script outputs, it involves running code from the target skill folder usingsys.executable. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The
scripts/agent_adapters.pyfile contains severalcurl | bashinstallation command strings for various coding agent CLIs. These URLs point to well-known and trusted services such as Anthropic, Google, Cursor, xAI, and Sourcegraph, and are provided as documentation and help text rather than being executed directly by the harness script. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests data from
evals/evals.jsonin external skill directories and uses it to drive agent prompts and script execution. This creates a surface where a malicious skill under evaluation could attempt to influence the host agent's behavior. - Ingestion points: Reads
evals/evals.jsonand script files from the target--skilldirectory. - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or boundary instructions are used when interpolating eval data into the agent's execution prompt.
- Capability inventory: Uses
subprocess.runto execute scripts and drive CLI agents; usesWriteto create and scaffold workspace directories. - Sanitization: The harness performs basic JSON parsing but does not sanitize or escape the content of the eval prompts or script assertions before use.
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://antigravity.google/cli/install.sh, https://claude.ai/install.sh, https://cursor.com/install - DO NOT USE without thorough review
Audit Metadata