deep-execution
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 2, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes local utility and provider-specific bash scripts to perform its core functions.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdrunsscripts/query-council.shandscripts/validate-analysis.sh. - Evidence:
agent-prompt-template.mdruns scripts via the{SCRIPT_PATH}variable. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: User input and context are transmitted to external AI provider endpoints (such as OpenAI, Gemini, Grok, and Perplexity).
- Evidence: Subagents query these external services to generate comparative analyses as part of the skill's primary workflow.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill sources internal shell libraries at runtime to manage prompt roles and model fallback configurations.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdsourcesscripts/lib/prompts.shandscripts/lib/roles.sh. - Evidence:
agent-prompt-template.mdsourcesscripts/lib/model_fallback.sh. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes data returned from external AI models, creating a potential vector for indirect prompt injection attacks.
- Ingestion points: Provider responses are collected and returned to the main agent context in Step 3 of
SKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The implementation uses quoted heredocs (
<<'EOF') to safely handle external text and requires all responses to pass JSON schema validation viavalidate-analysis.sh. - Capability inventory: The skill maintains capabilities to write files to the local
.claude/council-cachedirectory and execute shell commands. - Sanitization: All external data is subjected to strict schema validation before being incorporated into the final synthesis, significantly reducing the risk of accidental instruction execution.
Audit Metadata