deep-execution

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 2, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes local utility and provider-specific bash scripts to perform its core functions.
  • Evidence: SKILL.md runs scripts/query-council.sh and scripts/validate-analysis.sh.
  • Evidence: agent-prompt-template.md runs scripts via the {SCRIPT_PATH} variable.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: User input and context are transmitted to external AI provider endpoints (such as OpenAI, Gemini, Grok, and Perplexity).
  • Evidence: Subagents query these external services to generate comparative analyses as part of the skill's primary workflow.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill sources internal shell libraries at runtime to manage prompt roles and model fallback configurations.
  • Evidence: SKILL.md sources scripts/lib/prompts.sh and scripts/lib/roles.sh.
  • Evidence: agent-prompt-template.md sources scripts/lib/model_fallback.sh.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes data returned from external AI models, creating a potential vector for indirect prompt injection attacks.
  • Ingestion points: Provider responses are collected and returned to the main agent context in Step 3 of SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: The implementation uses quoted heredocs (<<'EOF') to safely handle external text and requires all responses to pass JSON schema validation via validate-analysis.sh.
  • Capability inventory: The skill maintains capabilities to write files to the local .claude/council-cache directory and execute shell commands.
  • Sanitization: All external data is subjected to strict schema validation before being incorporated into the final synthesis, significantly reducing the risk of accidental instruction execution.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 2, 2026, 11:52 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — deep-execution