merged
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 27, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests data from untrusted sources within the repository to guide its operations, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection attacks.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads
STATUS.md,AGENTS.md,README.md, handoff documents, and issue trackers from the repository to identify project-specific installation commands and determine the next items of work. - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or boundary instructions are used to isolate the content of these repository files from the agent's instructional context.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the capability to execute shell commands via
git,gh, andbash, as well as running arbitrary repository-defined installation commands. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of validation or sanitization of the commands or task descriptions retrieved from the project files before they are acted upon.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs a variety of shell operations to automate repository maintenance.
- It executes internal Bash scripts provided with the skill (
classify.sh,delete_head.sh,wait_merged.sh) to perform branch analysis and PR monitoring. - It runs repository-specific installation commands (e.g.,
npm install,pnpm install,pip install) when it detects changes to lockfiles. - For Adobe-related repositories, it routes Git and GitHub CLI operations through a local environment script at
~/Projects/adobe/scripts/with-adobe-route. - [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The
classify.shscript accesses the agent's internal state database at~/.t3/userdata/statev2.sqliteto identify worktrees currently bound to active agent threads, preventing the deletion of worktrees that are still in use.
Audit Metadata