heyeddi-ci-config
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 11, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The
load_policy_contracttool fetches a JSON policy contract fromcihook.heyeddi.com. The script allows this URL to be overridden via theurlparameter orHEYEDDI_CI_POLICY_URLenvironment variable, enabling downloads from arbitrary remote sources. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/load_policy_contract.pyimplements dynamic loading of Python modules. It inserts a path derived from theHEYEDDI_CI_ROOTenvironment variable or the--heyeddi-ci-rootargument intosys.pathand performs an import (from app.policy_insights import public_policy_contract), which allows execution of arbitrary local code. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The utility script
scripts/_skill_cli.pyincludes arun_commandfunction that utilizessubprocess.runto execute list-based commands. While this utility is not directly exposed as a primary tool, its presence provides a capability surface for command execution within the skill's operational environment. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it is instructed to treat external JSON data as authoritative guidance for its behavior.
- Ingestion points: Data is ingested from the remote endpoint
https://cihook.heyeddi.com/api/public/eddi-ci-policyvia theload_policy_contracttool. - Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit delimiters or warnings to treat the fetched
guideandrulesfields as untrusted content. - Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities for network requests (
load_policy_contract), repository scanning (inspect_repo), and file system writes (eddi-ci.yaml). - Sanitization: The script validates that the response is JSON but does not sanitize the natural language strings within the response that are used to influence agent decisions.
Audit Metadata