heyeddi-ci-runners
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 28, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Static analysis identified the use of
subprocess.runwithin a shared utility script (_skill_cli.py). However, this function is not called by any of the scripts exposed as tools in the manifest, and the implementation correctly uses list-based arguments rather than a shell, mitigating command injection risks. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The
load_policy_contract.pyscript fetches configuration schemas from the vendor's official domain (https://cihook.heyeddi.com). This is a legitimate operation for retrieving live policy data and does not involve the execution of remote scripts. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
runpy.run_pathto handle deprecated script aliases and dynamically adjustssys.pathto import modules from a local vendor tool (heyeddi-ci) if present. These are controlled executions of local files used for tool integration. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The
inspect_repotool reads file names and limited content from the project to identify development languages. While this exposes the agent to external data, the tool is read-only and lacks capabilities to execute data or write to the filesystem, neutralizing the impact of potential embedded instructions.
Audit Metadata