composable-patterns

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 11, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The helper script scripts/_skill_cli.py includes a run_command function wrapping subprocess.run. The implementation follows security best practices by disabling shell interpolation (shell=False) and resolving executable names to absolute paths via shutil.which to prevent path hijacking or injection.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The validate_composable.py script presents a standard injection surface by ingesting and analyzing user-provided source code files.
  • Ingestion points: The script reads file content via target.read_text() based on user-supplied paths.
  • Boundary markers: None are present in the processing logic.
  • Capability inventory: The tool is restricted to read-only file access and local script execution as defined in the manifest.json tool definition.
  • Sanitization: The script uses regex for static analysis and does not execute, evaluate, or pass the ingested content to an LLM, mitigating the risk of instructions being followed.
  • [SAFE]: The skill documentation and metadata focus on stylistic constraints and design patterns. The 'Prose Anti-slop' guidelines are benign behavior steering mechanisms for the AI agent.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 11, 2026, 03:38 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — composable-patterns