composable-patterns
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 11, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The helper script
scripts/_skill_cli.pyincludes arun_commandfunction wrappingsubprocess.run. The implementation follows security best practices by disabling shell interpolation (shell=False) and resolving executable names to absolute paths viashutil.whichto prevent path hijacking or injection. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The
validate_composable.pyscript presents a standard injection surface by ingesting and analyzing user-provided source code files. - Ingestion points: The script reads file content via
target.read_text()based on user-supplied paths. - Boundary markers: None are present in the processing logic.
- Capability inventory: The tool is restricted to read-only file access and local script execution as defined in the
manifest.jsontool definition. - Sanitization: The script uses regex for static analysis and does not execute, evaluate, or pass the ingested content to an LLM, mitigating the risk of instructions being followed.
- [SAFE]: The skill documentation and metadata focus on stylistic constraints and design patterns. The 'Prose Anti-slop' guidelines are benign behavior steering mechanisms for the AI agent.
Audit Metadata