engineering-excellence
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 11, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted content from the workspace and implementation plans, which could contain malicious instructions designed to influence the agent's behavior during the audit process.\n
- Ingestion points: The
audit_engineering.pyscript reads source files fromsrc/andbackend/directories, andcheck_engineering_plan.pyaccepts external plan text or files for analysis.\n - Boundary markers: The skill does not employ specific delimiters or warnings to indicate that the processed code or plans should be treated as untrusted data.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill is capable of writing files to the
.heyeddi/directory viaappend_decision.py,audit_engineering.py, andinit_engineering_docs.py. Although a subprocess execution helper is present in_skill_cli.py, it is not utilized by the core logic of the audit tools.\n - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the content read from external files before it is processed by the agent.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill includes boilerplate for command execution and instructions for the agent to run scripts from related skills.\n
- Evidence: The
_skill_cli.pyfile contains arun_commandhelper that usessubprocess.runwithshell=Falseto execute commands.\n - Evidence:
SKILL.mdcontains instructions for the agent to execute a script (suggest_next_skill.py) located in a sibling skill directory (heyeddi-orchestrator) for workflow handoffs.
Audit Metadata