heyeddi-product
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 11, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests and processes untrusted project-authored documentation (such as
product.mdand feature specs) which could contain malicious instructions designed to override agent behavior. - Ingestion points: Files are read in
scripts/load_product_context.pyandscripts/audit_product.pyto extract product requirements and routes. - Boundary markers: The skill utilizes a
wrap_untrusted_docutility inscripts/_untrusted_doc.pythat encapsulates untrusted content within<<<UNTRUSTED_PROJECT_DOC>>>tags, explicitly instructing the agent to treat the text as data only. - Capability inventory: The agent can perform file system writes within the
.heyeddi/directory and execute specific allowlisted sibling scripts via subprocess. - Sanitization: The implementation prioritizes structural delimiters and explicit instructional warnings to the agent to mitigate the risk of instruction leakage from data.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The tool
scripts/verify_product.pyexecutes other scripts within the skill's own directory using thesubprocessmodule. - Evidence: The script calls
subprocess.runto orchestrateaudit_product.pyandcheck_features.py. - Mitigation: It employs a strict allowlist (
_ALLOWED_SCRIPTS) and verifies that the resolved paths remain within the skill's local scripts directory, effectively preventing command injection or directory traversal attacks.
Audit Metadata