heyeddi
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 7, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted project data and pillar opinions, which could theoretically contain malicious instructions.
- Ingestion points: Reads content from
SKILL.mdfiles during catalog scanning and from.heyeddi/docs/workflow/opinions/during workflow context loading. - Boundary markers: The skill implements a dedicated security utility in
scripts/_untrusted_doc.pythat wraps processed text in<<<UNTRUSTED_PROJECT_DOC>>>tags, explicitly instructing the agent to treat the content as data only and ignore embedded instructions. - Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to write to the
.heyeddi/directory and execute theghCLI for update checks. - Sanitization: It uses structured JSON parsing for configuration and applies the aforementioned boundary markers to free-text pillar opinions to prevent accidental instruction following.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
subprocess.runinscripts/_skills_update.pyto invoke the GitHub CLI (gh) for checking version updates. This is implemented securely withshell=Falseto prevent command injection. The tool is rate-limited by a 24-hour throttle and only queries the vendor's official repository by default. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The
syncandcheck_skills_updatetools detect available updates from the vendor's GitHub repository. The skill follows a 'never auto-update' policy, ensuring that the agent only provides an installation prompt for the user to manually review and approve before any external code is modified or added.
Audit Metadata