x-posting-license
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 28, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes data from external X (Twitter) profiles which is considered untrusted input.
- Ingestion points: Profile data (name, bio, followers, etc.) is gathered from
x.comandapi.fxtwitter.comas described inSKILL.mdandreferences/profile-data.md. - Boundary markers: The skill instructions do not explicitly define boundary markers for the agent prompts, but the processing script enforces strict formatting.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to write files to the local file system and execute shell commands (
npx hyperframes) via the agent. - Sanitization: The
scripts/build.mjsfile provides robust sanitization, including stripping control characters, validating counter values as integers, and performing HTML escaping on all substituted strings to prevent template injection. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill depends on several external resources for its functionality.
- The
hyperframesCLI tool is fetched from the npm registry vianpxduring the render step. - The GSAP animation library is loaded from the
cdn.jsdelivr.netcontent delivery network at preview/render time. - Profile avatar images are downloaded from Twitter's image CDN (
pbs.twimg.com). - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill requires the execution of shell commands to generate and render the video.
- The agent is instructed to run
node scripts/build.mjsto prepare the project files. - The agent executes
npx hyperframes renderto perform the video rendering process, which involves a headless browser and GPU resources.
Audit Metadata