x-posting-license

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 28, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes data from external X (Twitter) profiles which is considered untrusted input.
  • Ingestion points: Profile data (name, bio, followers, etc.) is gathered from x.com and api.fxtwitter.com as described in SKILL.md and references/profile-data.md.
  • Boundary markers: The skill instructions do not explicitly define boundary markers for the agent prompts, but the processing script enforces strict formatting.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to write files to the local file system and execute shell commands (npx hyperframes) via the agent.
  • Sanitization: The scripts/build.mjs file provides robust sanitization, including stripping control characters, validating counter values as integers, and performing HTML escaping on all substituted strings to prevent template injection.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill depends on several external resources for its functionality.
  • The hyperframes CLI tool is fetched from the npm registry via npx during the render step.
  • The GSAP animation library is loaded from the cdn.jsdelivr.net content delivery network at preview/render time.
  • Profile avatar images are downloaded from Twitter's image CDN (pbs.twimg.com).
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill requires the execution of shell commands to generate and render the video.
  • The agent is instructed to run node scripts/build.mjs to prepare the project files.
  • The agent executes npx hyperframes render to perform the video rendering process, which involves a headless browser and GPU resources.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Aug 28, 2026, 03:34 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — x-posting-license