embedded-captions
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 19, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted user content by transcribing audio from video files into
transcript.json. The agent is then instructed incomposition-craft.mdto perform a 'role annotation' pass, judging tokens to decide which words to promote or emphasize. This allows potentially malicious instructions spoken in the video to enter the agent's context. - Ingestion points:
transcript.jsonproduced bytranscribe.cjs. - Boundary markers: Absent; the agent is directed to read and evaluate the raw transcript text.
- Capability inventory: The skill can execute shell commands via
ffmpegandnodethroughout the project lifecycle. - Sanitization: Absent; there is no validation or filtering of the transcript text before the agent analyzes it.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads packages and models during execution.
scripts/transcribe.cjsusesuvxto download and run thewhisperxPython package.scripts/matte.cjsuses thehyperframesCLI to download theu2net_human_segmodel (~168 MB) for background removal.- Templates such as
modes/standard/_anatomy.mdload thegsaplibrary from thejsdelivrCDN. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Most scripts in the
scripts/directory (audio-envelope.cjs,matte.cjs,check-occlusion.cjs, etc.) usechild_processmodules to executeffmpeg,ffprobe, and othernodescripts to perform video processing and layout validation. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: Measurement and validation scripts (
measure-layout.cjs,check-overflow.cjs,check-rail-climax.cjs) utilize Puppeteer to load local HTML files and execute JavaScript viapage.evaluate()to determine the physical bounding boxes of rendered text.
Audit Metadata