embedded-captions

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 19, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted user content by transcribing audio from video files into transcript.json. The agent is then instructed in composition-craft.md to perform a 'role annotation' pass, judging tokens to decide which words to promote or emphasize. This allows potentially malicious instructions spoken in the video to enter the agent's context.
  • Ingestion points: transcript.json produced by transcribe.cjs.
  • Boundary markers: Absent; the agent is directed to read and evaluate the raw transcript text.
  • Capability inventory: The skill can execute shell commands via ffmpeg and node throughout the project lifecycle.
  • Sanitization: Absent; there is no validation or filtering of the transcript text before the agent analyzes it.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads packages and models during execution.
  • scripts/transcribe.cjs uses uvx to download and run the whisperx Python package.
  • scripts/matte.cjs uses the hyperframes CLI to download the u2net_human_seg model (~168 MB) for background removal.
  • Templates such as modes/standard/_anatomy.md load the gsap library from the jsdelivr CDN.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Most scripts in the scripts/ directory (audio-envelope.cjs, matte.cjs, check-occlusion.cjs, etc.) use child_process modules to execute ffmpeg, ffprobe, and other node scripts to perform video processing and layout validation.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: Measurement and validation scripts (measure-layout.cjs, check-overflow.cjs, check-rail-climax.cjs) utilize Puppeteer to load local HTML files and execute JavaScript via page.evaluate() to determine the physical bounding boxes of rendered text.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 19, 2026, 04:55 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — embedded-captions