skills/heygen-com/skills/heygen-video/Gen Agent Trust Hub

heygen-video

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 19, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an indirect prompt injection attack surface.
  • Ingestion points: External data enters the agent context via the WebFetch tool when analyzing user-provided URLs in the asset handling workflow defined in references/asset-routing.md.
  • Boundary markers: The skill lacks explicit boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded commands when interpolating retrieved web content into the Video Agent prompt.
  • Capability inventory: The skill can execute privileged operations including video generation, asset uploads, and local file management via the heygen CLI and MCP tools.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of fetched remote content before it is included in the generation prompt.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Documentation in SKILL.md provides an installation command for the HeyGen CLI (curl -fsSL https://static.heygen.ai/cli/install.sh | bash). While this utilizes a piped-to-bash execution pattern, the source is the vendor's official domain (static.heygen.ai), which is an expected path for service setup.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The scripts/update-check.sh script performs an external request to the author's public GitHub repository (heygen-com/skills) to check for available updates.
Recommendations
  • HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://static.heygen.ai/cli/install.sh - DO NOT USE without thorough review
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
May 19, 2026, 06:54 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — heygen-video