heygen-video
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 19, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an indirect prompt injection attack surface.
- Ingestion points: External data enters the agent context via the
WebFetchtool when analyzing user-provided URLs in the asset handling workflow defined inreferences/asset-routing.md. - Boundary markers: The skill lacks explicit boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded commands when interpolating retrieved web content into the Video Agent prompt.
- Capability inventory: The skill can execute privileged operations including video generation, asset uploads, and local file management via the
heygenCLI and MCP tools. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of fetched remote content before it is included in the generation prompt.
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Documentation in
SKILL.mdprovides an installation command for the HeyGen CLI (curl -fsSL https://static.heygen.ai/cli/install.sh | bash). While this utilizes a piped-to-bash execution pattern, the source is the vendor's official domain (static.heygen.ai), which is an expected path for service setup. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The
scripts/update-check.shscript performs an external request to the author's public GitHub repository (heygen-com/skills) to check for available updates.
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://static.heygen.ai/cli/install.sh - DO NOT USE without thorough review
Audit Metadata