handoff
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 1, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes the entire conversation history, which is untrusted data that may contain malicious instructions designed to influence the handoff document.
- Ingestion points: The agent context is populated by the "current conversation" summary as described in SKILL.md.
- Boundary markers: None present in the instructions to separate conversation data from the summarization logic.
- Capability inventory: The agent is instructed to perform a file system write operation to the user's OS temporary directory.
- Sanitization: The instructions include a manual redaction requirement for API keys and PII, but no technical sanitization or escaping of input data to prevent prompt injection.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill explicitly instructs the agent to save data to the temporary directory of the user's OS, which involves file system operations outside the standard project workspace.
- Evidence: SKILL.md specifies "Save to the temporary directory of the user's OS
- not the current workspace."
Audit Metadata