upgrade
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Fetches version metadata and clones the project source code from the author's official GitHub repository (
https://github.com/heyitsnoah/claudesidian). These operations are consistent with the skill's primary function. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Executes shell commands via the Bash tool to manage files, create backups, and perform version comparisons.
- Invokes a Python validation script (
quick_validate.py) from the cloned repository usinguv runto verify skill schema integrity during migration. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Implements an 'AI-merge' process that reads and processes data from the external repository, presenting a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted content is read from files in the temporary directory
.tmp/claudesidian-upgrade/(cloned from GitHub) into the LLM context. - Boundary markers: The skill does not explicitly define delimiters or 'ignore embedded instructions' warnings for the data being merged.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to
Bash,Write, andEdittools, which could be misused if malicious instructions in the upstream code were obeyed. - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or filtering is performed on the remote file content before it is processed by the AI for conflict resolution.
Audit Metadata