higgsfield-generate

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 5, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the agent to download and install the higgsfield CLI from the author's official GitHub repository (github.com/higgsfield-ai/cli) if it is not already present.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: During the bootstrap phase, the skill executes a shell script downloaded directly from the vendor's repository (https://raw.githubusercontent.com/higgsfield-ai/cli/main/install.sh | sh). This is a legitimate installation method for the vendor's own tooling.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of the Bash tool to interact with the Higgsfield platform, including complex command construction that uses temporary files to pass JSON-structured arguments for avatars and product data.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill features capabilities to fetch content from external URLs to generate brand kits and product entities, creating a potential surface for indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: higgsfield marketing-studio products fetch --url <url> and higgsfield marketing-studio brand-kits fetch --url <url> as documented in references/marketing-products.md and references/marketing-brand-kits.md.
  • Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions to the agent to treat the imported content as untrusted or to wrap it in delimiters.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has access to the Bash tool to execute a wide variety of CLI commands as seen in SKILL.md.
  • Sanitization: The skill relies on the Higgsfield CLI and backend to handle the scraping and processing of the external data before it is returned as structured entities.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Nov 5, 2026, 08:38 PM