higgsfield-generate
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 5, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the agent to download and install the
higgsfieldCLI from the author's official GitHub repository (github.com/higgsfield-ai/cli) if it is not already present. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: During the bootstrap phase, the skill executes a shell script downloaded directly from the vendor's repository (
https://raw.githubusercontent.com/higgsfield-ai/cli/main/install.sh | sh). This is a legitimate installation method for the vendor's own tooling. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of the
Bashtool to interact with the Higgsfield platform, including complex command construction that uses temporary files to pass JSON-structured arguments for avatars and product data. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill features capabilities to fetch content from external URLs to generate brand kits and product entities, creating a potential surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points:
higgsfield marketing-studio products fetch --url <url>andhiggsfield marketing-studio brand-kits fetch --url <url>as documented inreferences/marketing-products.mdandreferences/marketing-brand-kits.md. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions to the agent to treat the imported content as untrusted or to wrap it in delimiters.
- Capability inventory: The agent has access to the
Bashtool to execute a wide variety of CLI commands as seen inSKILL.md. - Sanitization: The skill relies on the Higgsfield CLI and backend to handle the scraping and processing of the external data before it is returned as structured entities.
Audit Metadata