higgsfield-marketplace-cards

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 27, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Fetches the official command-line interface (CLI) installer from the vendor's GitHub repository.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Executes a shell script downloaded from the vendor's repository (install.sh) to bootstrap the tool environment.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Runs the higgsfield marketplace-cards create command through the Bash tool using arguments derived from user input.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill incorporates untrusted user input into shell commands, creating a potential vector for indirect prompt or command injection.
  • Ingestion points: User prompts and image file paths are ingested in SKILL.md to be used as CLI arguments.
  • Boundary markers: The skill suggests using double quotes around the --prompt argument, but lacks robust delimiters or escaping instructions for the agent.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has access to the Bash tool, allowing for full command execution.
  • Sanitization: The instructions do not specify any validation or sanitization steps for user-provided strings before they are executed.
Recommendations
  • HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/higgsfield-ai/cli/main/install.sh - DO NOT USE without thorough review
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Sep 27, 2026, 03:51 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — higgsfield-marketplace-cards