telegram-reader

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 20, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_CONTEXT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill recommends installing the tdl dependency using the command curl -sSL https://docs.iyear.me/tdl/install.sh | sudo bash. Piping an external script from an unverified source directly into a shell is a critical security risk that allows for arbitrary code execution.
  • [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The recommended installation procedure explicitly uses sudo bash, granting root-level permissions to an external script.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from external Telegram channels.
  • Ingestion points: External message content is exported and read from /tmp/tdl-export.json (as described in SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: No delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands are present when processing the message data.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has capabilities for network access (via tdl), file reading (cat), and environment manipulation (tdl login).
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering applied to the message content before it is processed by the agent, allowing malicious messages to potentially override agent behavior.
  • [DYNAMIC_CONTEXT_INJECTION]: The SKILL.md file utilizes the !command syntax to execute shell commands at skill load time to check for the presence of tdl and verify its authentication status. While the specific commands used (tdl version and tdl chat ls) appear benign, this mechanism executes code automatically without user intervention.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on executing various shell commands and the tdl CLI tool to perform its primary functions, including cat, date, and complex tdl chat export operations.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Oct 20, 2026, 06:45 AM