ultra-research

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 3, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill attempts to execute bash scripts located at $HOME/.claude/scripts/codex-research.sh and $HOME/.claude/scripts/lib/obsidian-export.sh. These scripts are external to the skill package and their security posture cannot be verified statically.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Research artifacts and findings are transmitted to external services including Perplexity, Exa, and Codex for verification and processing. While these are presented as research tools, they represent a data flow to external infrastructure.
  • [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The skill contains a hardcoded user-specific file path for memory synchronization: ~/.claude/projects/-Users-nmaximov/memory/. This may lead to unexpected behavior or failures on systems with different directory structures.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill uses source to load and execute the contents of $HOME/.claude/scripts/lib/obsidian-export.sh into the current shell environment, which is a high-risk operation for externally sourced scripts.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: The skill scrapes over 150 untrusted external sources into the .firecrawl/research/ directory.
  • Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands when the agent reads this data in the 'Fact-checker' or 'Critic' phases.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to execute shell commands (via Pandoc and bash scripts) and write files to the local system.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or filtering of scraped content is performed before it is passed to subsequent agent roles for synthesis.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
May 3, 2026, 11:15 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — ultra-research