ultra-research
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 3, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill attempts to execute bash scripts located at
$HOME/.claude/scripts/codex-research.shand$HOME/.claude/scripts/lib/obsidian-export.sh. These scripts are external to the skill package and their security posture cannot be verified statically. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Research artifacts and findings are transmitted to external services including Perplexity, Exa, and Codex for verification and processing. While these are presented as research tools, they represent a data flow to external infrastructure.
- [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The skill contains a hardcoded user-specific file path for memory synchronization:
~/.claude/projects/-Users-nmaximov/memory/. This may lead to unexpected behavior or failures on systems with different directory structures. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
sourceto load and execute the contents of$HOME/.claude/scripts/lib/obsidian-export.shinto the current shell environment, which is a high-risk operation for externally sourced scripts. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: The skill scrapes over 150 untrusted external sources into the
.firecrawl/research/directory. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands when the agent reads this data in the 'Fact-checker' or 'Critic' phases.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to execute shell commands (via Pandoc and bash scripts) and write files to the local system.
- Sanitization: No sanitization or filtering of scraped content is performed before it is passed to subsequent agent roles for synthesis.
Audit Metadata