ask-gemini
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 26, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides instructions for interacting with a local
geminiCLI and highlights the-yand--yoloflags. These flags allow the tool to automatically execute shell commands or tool calls generated by the AI without human-in-the-loop verification, which bypasses a critical security boundary for local command execution.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill creates a surface for indirect prompt injection because it is designed to process untrusted external data (such as code for review or refactoring) and pass it to an LLM-powered CLI with execution capabilities.\n - Ingestion points: Prompts and local project files passed as positional arguments to the
geminicommand in the provided examples.\n - Boundary markers: None. There are no instructions or delimiters defined to prevent the underlying model from following malicious instructions embedded within the files being processed.\n
- Capability inventory: The
geminiCLI can execute shell commands, a capability exposed to the agent through theBashtool permissions defined in the YAML frontmatter.\n - Sanitization: The skill does not implement or describe any validation or sanitization of the CLI's output before execution.
Audit Metadata