hyperframes-media
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 19, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill documentation describes the automated download of several AI models during initial command execution. This includes the Kokoro-82M model (~311 MB) for text-to-speech, various Whisper models (up to 3.1 GB) for transcription, and u2net_human_seg weights (~168 MB) for background removal.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The instructions require the agent to execute multiple shell commands. These include using
npx hyperframesfor media tasks,pip install kokoro-onnx soundfilefor Python-based dependencies, and system-level installations viabreworapt-getfor theespeak-ngphonemizer. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted user data, which creates a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: The
ttscommand accepts arbitrary text strings or text file contents as input, while thetranscribecommand processes external audio and video files. - Boundary markers: There is no evidence of boundary markers or specific instructions for the agent to ignore or escape potentially malicious instructions embedded within the user-provided text or media files.
- Capability inventory: The skill's environment supports command-line execution and file system writes to both output paths and a local cache directory (
~/.cache/hyperframes/). - Sanitization: The skill lacks explicit sanitization or validation steps for input data before it is passed to the underlying processing tools.
Audit Metadata