buildkite
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 6, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes build logs and artifacts from Buildkite jobs. These external data sources can be influenced by anyone with commit access to a repository, potentially containing instructions designed to manipulate the agent's behavior. * Ingestion points: The
scripts/buildkitescript fetches logs via thebk job logcommand, and instructions inSKILL.mdandreferences/build-debugging.mdguide the agent to analyze this content. * Boundary markers: The skill does not implement or instruct the agent to use boundary markers to isolate log content from its own instructions. * Capability inventory: The skill enables triggering new builds, canceling active jobs, and accessing the full Buildkite REST API, providing a significant surface for exploitation if the agent is manipulated. * Sanitization: No sanitization is performed on the log content before it is presented to the agent. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The setup script installs the official Buildkite CLI and the
jqutility using the Homebrew package manager. * Evidence:scripts/setupcontains commands tobrew install jqandbrew tap buildkite/buildkite && brew install buildkite/buildkite/bk. * Context: These are standard installations of official tools from a well-known service provider. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides a wrapper script that passes user-provided arguments directly to the Buildkite CLI. * Evidence: The
scripts/buildkitescript concludes withexec bk "$@", allowing the agent to execute any supported Buildkite CLI command.
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