skills/hk-hub/agentskills/openai-docs/Gen Agent Trust Hub

openai-docs

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 19, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The instructions in SKILL.md explicitly direct the agent to retry MCP server installation commands with "escalated permissions" if an initial attempt is blocked by security or permission constraints.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The helper script scripts/fetch-codex-manual.mjs executes curl or curl.exe via execFile, which allows the agent to run system binaries to fetch content.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches documentation and update information from OpenAI developer domains (developers.openai.com). These references are documented here as part of the skill's normal operation to maintain up-to-date documentation.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill retrieves and processes external Markdown content from remote URLs which could potentially introduce untrusted instructions.
  • Ingestion points: Documentation is fetched using scripts/fetch-codex-manual.mjs and scripts/resolve-latest-model-info.js.
  • Boundary markers: The skill does not implement specific delimiters or warnings to isolate the fetched external content from the model's instruction logic.
  • Capability inventory: The skill can execute shell commands (curl) and perform file system operations (write to cache).
  • Sanitization: The documentation fetcher performs SHA-256 hash validation to verify the integrity of the downloaded manual.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Aug 19, 2026, 05:30 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — openai-docs