autoskill
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 30, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection as it processes untrusted data from the user's screen capture history and uses an LLM to synthesize new skill instructions.
- Ingestion points:
scripts/fetch_window.pyretrieves OCR text and window titles from the localscreenpipeHTTP API. - Boundary markers: The prompt construction in
scripts/synthesize.pydoes not use explicit delimiters or 'ignore embedded instructions' warnings when passing observed data to the LLM. - Capability inventory: The skill uses
Read,Write,Edit, andBashtools to create, modify, and promote files within the agent's skill library. - Sanitization:
scripts/redact.pyprovides robust regex-based redaction of PII (emails, phone numbers) and credentials (API keys, tokens) before data is sent to the LLM, but it does not sanitize against instructional content that might influence the LLM's synthesis logic. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill reads highly sensitive local data (everything on the user's screen). While it defaults to a local LLM backend (LM Studio) and provides PII redaction, an optional cloud backend (Claude) is available which would involve sending redacted summaries to an external service.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes the
Bashtool inscripts/doctor.pyandscripts/autoskill.pyto perform system diagnostics, verify dependencies like thescreenpipedaemon, and manage the promotion of drafted skills into the production environment.
Audit Metadata