cli-anything-macrocli
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill is primarily designed to execute shell commands and subprocesses via its
native_apibackend. - Evidence: The documentation explicitly lists the
native_apibackend as being triggered by therun_commandaction for subprocess and shell command execution. - Evidence: The macro YAML schema example shows the execution of arbitrary commands:
command: [my-app, --export, "${output}"]. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill creates a surface for indirect injection by interpolating user-supplied parameters into command templates within macro definitions.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the context through the
--paramflag in themacro runcommand and via YAML files stored incli_anything/macrocli/macro_definitions/. - Boundary markers: The skill does not document any boundary markers or escaping mechanisms for the
${variable}interpolation syntax. - Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities for subprocess execution, file writing/transformation, and GUI interaction.
- Sanitization: There is no documented evidence of input validation or sanitization for parameters before they are executed in a shell context.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The
gui_macrobackend executes precompiled files, which may involve runtime binary or script execution. - Evidence: The documentation identifies
gui_macroas a backend for "Precompiled coordinate replay". - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The installation process involves installing Python dependencies from a local harness.
- Evidence: Installation instructions require
pip install -e .from themacrocli/agent-harnessdirectory, which pulls in thePyYAML,click, andprompt-toolkitpackages.
Audit Metadata