skill-discovery
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 30, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The
search_skillstool includes anauto_importparameter that is enabled by default (true). This causes the agent to automatically download content from an external "cloud community" to the local filesystem during any skill search operation. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill documentation explicitly instructs the agent to "read SKILL.md at local_path, follow the instructions" for any content downloaded from the cloud registry. This allows a remote third party to provide arbitrary instructions that the agent will execute as its own logic.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill architecture creates a high-risk surface for indirect prompt injection by processing and obeying instructions from untrusted external data.
- Ingestion points: The
search_skillstool retrievesSKILL.mdfiles from a cloud-based registry to alocal_path. - Boundary markers: There are no boundary markers or instructions provided to the agent to treat the external content as untrusted or to ignore embedded instructions.
- Capability inventory: The agent is granted full capability to "follow the instructions" in the downloaded file, which can involve any tools or system commands the agent is authorized to use.
- Sanitization: No sanitization, validation, or human-in-the-loop verification steps are described before the agent executes the remote instructions.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata