strategy-dev-manager
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 30, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONPERSISTENCECOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill generates Python code (
signal_engine.py) using provided templates and user-extracted logic from papers, which is subsequently executed via thebacktesttool. This introduces a risk if the generation logic is influenced by malicious content. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a large attack surface for indirect prompt injection due to its core workflow:
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context through the
read_documenttool, which parses external PDF papers and research reports (SKILL.md Phase 1). - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify any delimiters or safety warnings to prevent the agent from following instructions embedded within the paper text.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses high-impact capabilities, including the ability to generate and execute Python code via
backtestand perform syntax checks usingbash(SKILL.md Phase 3). - Sanitization: There is no documented sanitization or validation of the extracted mathematical formulas or logic before they are used to scaffold and implement the executable SignalEngine.
- [PERSISTENCE]: The skill utilizes a
ScheduledResearchExecutor(documented inreferences/scheduled_decay_scan.md) which allows for the creation of persistent, scheduled jobs that fire research prompts periodically. This background execution mechanism could be leveraged to maintain long-term persistence for malicious tasks or exfiltration loops. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: In Phase 3 (IMPLEMENT), the skill executes a shell command via
bash("python -c ...")to validate the syntax of the generatedsignal_engine.pyscript. While intended for validation, this represents a direct command execution path for locally generated content.
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