align
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 10, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill analyzes data from pull requests and chat transcripts to infer user preferences, which represents a potential surface for instructions embedded in external content.
- Ingestion points: Data is read from the GitHub API using
scripts/collect_pr_feedback.pyand from local transcript files viascripts/collect_chat_feedback.py. - Boundary markers: Explicit instructions in
SKILL.mdandreferences/history.mdwarn the agent to treat this content as untrusted evidence rather than direct instructions. - Capability inventory: The skill can update project instruction files (
AGENTS.md,CLAUDE.md) and create symlinks usingscripts/connect_project.py. It also performs network requests and data retrieval via the GitHub CLI inscripts/collect_pr_feedback.pyand writes temporary data inscripts/history_common.py. - Sanitization: Results are filtered for supported message types and schemas. All proposed criteria updates require explicit user review and confirmation before being persisted to the
ALIGNS.mdfile. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the GitHub CLI (
gh) to retrieve project metadata and feedback history. - Evidence:
scripts/collect_pr_feedback.pyexecutesgh apiviasubprocess.runto fetch pull request information. The command is invoked with a hardcoded argument list and the repository name is validated against a strict regex to prevent shell injection. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references external assets and leverages established machine learning libraries for local analysis.
- Evidence:
references/badge.mdincludes a link to an SVG asset hosted on the author's official GitHub repository.scripts/check_training_adapter.pyutilizes thetransformerslibrary to perform tokenization checks; notably, it is configured withtrust_remote_code=Falseto prevent the execution of arbitrary remote code during the check.
Audit Metadata