project-orchestrator

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 14, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on a suite of custom slash commands (/opsx:new, /opsx:apply, /opsx:verify, etc.) to interact with the Fission-AI CLI and manage the project lifecycle. While these are presented as internal tools, they represent the primary interface for system interaction.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data which could serve as an injection vector.
  • Ingestion points: The agent reads from openspec/specs/, openspec/changes/, tasks.md, and design.md to determine its actions.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions do not define specific delimiters or "ignore instructions" wrappers for the content read from these files.
  • Capability inventory: The skill (through its sub-skills) has the capability to write files, execute shell commands (via mcp-loop), and perform git operations.
  • Sanitization: There is no explicit evidence of sanitization or validation of the instructions contained within the read specification files.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The workflow involves generating Flutter code (flutter-coding) and immediately building/executing it to verify functionality (mcp-loop). This automated generate-and-run cycle is a standard feature of the developer agent but remains a monitored behavior as it executes code constructed by the LLM.
  • [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The skill identifies the need for sensitive credentials (API keys for Firebase, Google Maps) but follows a safe practice by explicitly instructing the agent to stop and prompt the user rather than attempting to harvest or exfiltrate them.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Aug 14, 2026, 01:43 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — project-orchestrator