project-orchestrator
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on a suite of custom slash commands (
/opsx:new,/opsx:apply,/opsx:verify, etc.) to interact with the Fission-AI CLI and manage the project lifecycle. While these are presented as internal tools, they represent the primary interface for system interaction. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data which could serve as an injection vector.
- Ingestion points: The agent reads from
openspec/specs/,openspec/changes/,tasks.md, anddesign.mdto determine its actions. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define specific delimiters or "ignore instructions" wrappers for the content read from these files.
- Capability inventory: The skill (through its sub-skills) has the capability to write files, execute shell commands (via
mcp-loop), and perform git operations. - Sanitization: There is no explicit evidence of sanitization or validation of the instructions contained within the read specification files.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The workflow involves generating Flutter code (
flutter-coding) and immediately building/executing it to verify functionality (mcp-loop). This automated generate-and-run cycle is a standard feature of the developer agent but remains a monitored behavior as it executes code constructed by the LLM. - [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The skill identifies the need for sensitive credentials (API keys for Firebase, Google Maps) but follows a safe practice by explicitly instructing the agent to stop and prompt the user rather than attempting to harvest or exfiltrate them.
Audit Metadata