ai-artist
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests user-provided concept descriptions and interpolates them into prompt templates retrieved from its local database.
- Ingestion points: The
conceptargument inscripts/generate.pyandscripts/search.pyserves as the entry point for untrusted user data. - Boundary markers: The prompt templates in
data/awesome-prompts.csvanddata/nano-banana-templates.csvdo not utilize explicit delimiters or instructions to prevent the model from following instructions embedded within the user's concept description. - Capability inventory: The skill possesses the capability to make network requests to the Gemini API and write image files to the local file system.
- Sanitization: The
adapt_promptfunction inscripts/generate.pyuses regex for placeholder replacement but does not perform sanitization, escaping, or validation of the user's input before interpolation. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The execution scripts
scripts/generate.pyandscripts/search.pymodify the Python module search path (sys.path) at runtime. This allows the skill to load environment resolution utilities and other scripts from the user's home directory (~/.claude/scripts) and parent project directories, which is a characteristic of the targeted execution environment. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill depends on the
google-genailibrary to facilitate communication with Google's image generation models.
Audit Metadata