Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 24, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external PDF files, which is a known surface for indirect prompt injection attacks where malicious content in a document could influence agent behavior.
- Ingestion points: PDF reading operations in
SKILL.mdand scripts such asscripts/extract_form_field_info.pyandscripts/extract_form_structure.py. - Boundary markers: None identified; the skill does not explicitly instruct the agent to ignore instructions embedded within the processed PDF content.
- Capability inventory: The skill can execute various CLI tools (
qpdf,pdftotext,magick) and write files to the filesystem. - Sanitization: No sanitization of the extracted PDF text or metadata is implemented before the data is processed by the agent.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill documentation provides instructions for the agent to use several command-line utilities for PDF manipulation.
- Evidence: Instructions for using
pdftotext,qpdf,pdftk, andmagick(ImageMagick) are documented inSKILL.mdandforms.mdfor PDF processing and image refinement. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references several well-known libraries for PDF processing, which are treated as safe resources.
- Evidence: Mentions of standard packages including
pypdf,pdfplumber,reportlab,pytesseract,pdf2image,pypdfium2,pdf-lib, andpdfjs-dist.
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