remotion-best-practices
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 24, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill provides instructions in
rules/transcribe-captions.mdto download and install theWhisper.cppbinary using the@remotion/install-whisper-cpppackage, followed by its execution for transcription tasks. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: In
rules/transcribe-captions.md, the skill includes code examples that utilizechild_process.execSyncto runffmpegshell commands for audio conversion. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill facilitates downloading external assets and binaries. This includes fetching Lottie animations from LottieFiles and downloading Whisper.cpp models.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Several rules (e.g.,
rules/calculate-metadata.md,rules/compositions.md,rules/lottie.md) demonstrate fetching data from URLs provided via component properties (e.g.,props.dataUrl,props.videoId). This pattern creates a potential vector for data exfiltration if an attacker-controlled URL is supplied to the agent. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process untrusted external data, such as
.srtsubtitle files, JSON caption files, and video metadata from remote URLs. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious instructions embedded in these files could influence the agent's behavior during processing. - Ingestion points:
rules/import-srt-captions.md(SRT parsing),rules/display-captions.md(JSON fetching),rules/calculate-metadata.md(metadata fetching). - Boundary markers: Absent in code examples; the agent is instructed to process the data directly.
- Capability inventory: Includes network fetching (
fetch), command execution (execSync), and binary installation. - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or validation logic is shown for the content of the external files being processed.
Audit Metadata