usps-webhooks
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 24, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from external USPS webhook notifications, which could contain malicious instructions targeting the agent's logic (Indirect Prompt Injection).
- Ingestion points: Webhook request bodies are parsed in
examples/express/src/index.js,examples/fastapi/main.py, andexamples/nextjs/app/webhooks/usps/route.ts. - Boundary markers: None; the JSON payload is processed directly without delimiters.
- Capability inventory: Example handlers perform logging and logic dispatching based on tracking status. While currently benign, this pattern can be used for more sensitive operations.
- Sanitization: No validation or sanitization of the payload content is performed before logging or use in control flow.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill's example configuration files reference external dependencies with unrealistic version numbers.
- Evidence: References to
next@16.2.11,typescript@7.0.2,vitest@4.1.10,jest@30.4.2,fastapi>=0.139.2, andpytest>=9.1.1inpackage.jsonandrequirements.txt. These versions are significantly higher than the current stable releases. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Documentation suggests executing a CLI tool for local development.
- Evidence:
npx hookdeck-cli listen ...inSKILL.mdand project READMEs. This command downloads and runs a tool from the skill's author.
Audit Metadata