extension-creator
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill provides instructions and templates for building extensions that ingest untrusted data, which creates a surface for indirect prompt injection attacks. \n
- Ingestion points: Extensions process data through event handlers such as
onAgentStarted,onPromptSubmitted,onToolCalled, andonRuleFilesRetrieved(defined inreferences/extension-interface.md). \n - Boundary markers: The provided templates in
assets/templates/do not include automated boundary markers or prompt delimiters for external content. \n - Capability inventory: Extensions have the capability to modify agent system prompts, inject context messages, block tool execution (e.g.,
onToolCalled), and interact with the project environment via theExtensionContext(documented inreferences/event-types.mdandreferences/extension-interface.md). \n - Sanitization: The skill does not enforce automated sanitization for external content, though it includes a reference to manual permission gating in
references/examples-gallery.md. \n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides documentation and examples for extensions that interact with system commands. \n - Evidence: The
Permission Gateexample inreferences/examples-gallery.mddemonstrates how to monitor and intercept bash tool calls. \n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references external resources and dependencies as part of the extension development workflow. \n - Evidence: The skill fetches extension type definitions from the vendor's official GitHub repository (
raw.githubusercontent.com/hotovo/aider-desk) and provides instructions for managing Node.js dependencies in folder-based extensions.
Audit Metadata