Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 3, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructions and reference documents recommend installing various third-party PDF processing libraries and command-line utilities, including
pypdf,pdfplumber,reportlab,pytesseract,pdf2image,poppler-utils, andqpdf. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The toolkit includes multiple Python scripts in the
scripts/directory that are intended to be executed as part of the PDF processing workflow for tasks such as converting PDFs to images, extracting form field information, and filling PDF forms. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it processes untrusted PDF documents. A malicious PDF could contain visual elements or text designed to mislead the agent during the automated or visual analysis steps.
- Ingestion points: PDF files are converted to images by
scripts/convert_pdf_to_images.pyfor visual inspection by the agent. - Boundary markers: The skill does not employ explicit boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded directives when analyzing PDF content.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the capability to write files, modify PDF structures, and execute local scripts based on the analysis of the untrusted data.
- Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the input PDF content is performed.
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/fill_fillable_fields.pyperforms dynamic modification of code at runtime by monkeypatching thepypdflibrary'sDictionaryObject.get_inheritedmethod. While this is used to address a specific bug in the library's form handling, it represents a dynamic execution pattern.
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