using-woostack
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 7, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and prioritize project-level instructions from files such as
AGENTS.md,CLAUDE.md, and.cursorrules. This creates a surface where an attacker contributing to a repository could influence agent behavior by providing malicious project-level rules. - Ingestion points: The skill reads configuration and rules from repository files:
AGENTS.md,CLAUDE.md,.cursorrules,.omp/settings.json, andartifacts.providersettings. - Boundary markers: The instructions explicitly tell the agent to "Follow this file [AGENTS.md] first when it conflicts with generic agent defaults," granting external data high precedence over the agent's internal logic.
- Capability inventory: The skill can dispatch subagents (via
Task,@subagent, and other primitives), execute GitHub CLI commands (gh), and invoke MCP tools for task management systems like Linear and Plane. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, validation, or instruction-filtering applied to the ingested project files.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill adapter for the OMP (Oh My Pi) host invokes a project-local tool called
woostack_rename_session. This tool is defined within the project's own.omp/extensionsdirectory. While this allows for local code execution, it appears to be a documented feature for session management rather than a malicious backdoor.
Audit Metadata