skills/howells/skills/paste-up/Gen Agent Trust Hub

paste-up

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 5, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external data which could contain malicious instructions to influence agent behavior.
  • Ingestion points: As described in SKILL.md, the agent reads project specifications, tracker context, project documentation, and comment threads.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions do not define clear boundaries or 'ignore' directives to prevent the agent from obeying instructions embedded within these external sources.
  • Capability inventory: The skill utilizes tools such as write_html, create_tokens, set_tokens, update_styles, and rename_nodes to modify design files.
  • Sanitization: No explicit content sanitization or validation of the ingested external data is mentioned.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill configuration points to a local network endpoint for its core functionality.
  • Source: The agents/openai.yaml file specifies a connection to http://127.0.0.1:29979/mcp.
  • Execution method: The skill uses a streamable_http transport to interact with the local MCP server.
  • Context: This represents a standard interface for local tool execution.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 5, 2026, 07:03 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — paste-up