starling
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 5, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXPOSURE_AND_EXFILTRATION]: The skill instructions direct the agent to read and load environment variables from a sensitive file at an absolute local path:
/Users/danielhowells/.codex/plugins/secrets/1password-service-account.env. This file is expected to contain aOP_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_TOKENused for credential management. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill relies on an external command-line utility,
starlingcli, hosted in a repository belonging to the skill author (github.com/howells/starlingcli). - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes shell commands using
op runandstarlingclito retrieve bank balances and transactions. It includes logic to bootstrap the environment by sourcing a local credential file and setting environment variables for Starling Bank tokens. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has an attack surface for indirect injection as it processes data from an external source (Starling Bank API via
starlingcli). - Ingestion points: Output from
starlingclicommands such asbalanceandtransactions(SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: None identified; the agent is instructed to use the structured JSON output directly.
- Capability inventory: The agent can execute subprocesses via
op runandstarlingcli(SKILL.md). - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or filtering of the bank's JSON responses is specified before the agent processes them.
Audit Metadata