openevidence
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 13, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill executes remote code from the vendor's infrastructure during environment setup and installation.
- The
.devcontainer/devcontainer.jsonfile contains anonCreateCommandthat downloads and executes a shell script fromhttps://raw.githubusercontent.com/htlin222/dotfiles/main/start/codespace_prewarm.shusingcurl | bash. - The
scripts/oe-mcp.shscript clones theopenevidence-mcprepository from GitHub (https://github.com/htlin222/openevidence-mcp.git) and invokesmake allandmake update, which executes commands defined in the external repository's Makefile. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses a bash script (
scripts/oe-mcp.sh) to perform management tasks such as repository cloning, directory creation, and building the MCP server and browser extension. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests and processes clinical data from the OpenEvidence API via MCP tools, creating a vulnerability surface where malicious instructions in the retrieved data could target the agent.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the agent's context through tools like
oe_article_get,oe_public_get, andoe_answers_searchwhich return content from the OpenEvidence service. - Boundary markers: The skill's instructions do not include specific delimiters or "ignore instructions" warnings for the external clinical content processed by the agent.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to shell command execution (
scripts/oe-mcp.sh), file system writes (via SQLite sync tools andmake), and network communication (via the relay daemon). - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or content validation steps are documented before interpolating the retrieved evidence into the agent's response.
Audit Metadata