docker-compose-guardrails
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 3, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill utilizes a configuration resolver (
scripts/resolve.py) that reads project-specific metadata and markdown profiles (e.g.,.agents/skills-config/docker-compose-guardrails/host-policy.md) and incorporates their content into instructions for the agent. - Ingestion points: Project-specific
config.yamland profile.mdfiles located in the repository's.agents/skills-config/directory. - Boundary markers: While the resolver adds markdown headers to separate sections, it lacks explicit delimitation or instructions to prevent the agent from executing instructions potentially embedded in untrusted project files.
- Capability inventory: The skill can execute
docker composeanddocker inspectvia structured subprocess calls and writes generated instruction sets to a local cache directory. - Sanitization: The implementation includes strict path-containment validation to mitigate directory traversal risks, though the text content of configuration files is processed without sanitization.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill invokes external binaries using the Python
subprocessmodule to interact with the Docker ecosystem. - Evidence: The
scripts/check_compose_guardrails.pyscript executes thedocker compose configcommand. - Context: These executions are restricted to static command lists and are necessary for validating resource guardrails within the target environment.
Audit Metadata