skills/hu3rror/my-skills/why/Gen Agent Trust Hub

why

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 19, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes large volumes of unstructured data from external sources such as Slack messages, PR comments, and Notion documents, which may contain instructions designed to influence the agent's conclusions.
  • Ingestion points: Data retrieved from MCP tools for Source Control, Issue Trackers, Documents, Chat, Observability, and Error Tracking platforms.
  • Boundary markers: The investigator and synthesizer prompt templates lack explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the fetched data records, though they emphasize epistemic discipline.
  • Capability inventory: Subagents are granted access to MCP tools with 'readonly: false' (agent mode), enabling them to interact with various organizational APIs.
  • Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or filtering of external content is performed before processing by the LLM.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses local and remote repository tools to gather initial context for investigations.
  • Evidence: Execution of git blame, git log, and gh pr view to establish the "Code Anchor" in Step 2 of SKILL.md.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill is designed to aggregate and synthesize sensitive information from across a company's infrastructure and communication tools.
  • Evidence: Step 3 of SKILL.md directs agents to perform a "full parallel investigation" to ensure "complete coverage," accessing platforms like Datadog, Sentry, Databricks, Slack, and Notion to build a cited rationale.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 19, 2026, 06:28 PM