why
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 19, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes large volumes of unstructured data from external sources such as Slack messages, PR comments, and Notion documents, which may contain instructions designed to influence the agent's conclusions.
- Ingestion points: Data retrieved from MCP tools for Source Control, Issue Trackers, Documents, Chat, Observability, and Error Tracking platforms.
- Boundary markers: The investigator and synthesizer prompt templates lack explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the fetched data records, though they emphasize epistemic discipline.
- Capability inventory: Subagents are granted access to MCP tools with 'readonly: false' (agent mode), enabling them to interact with various organizational APIs.
- Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or filtering of external content is performed before processing by the LLM.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses local and remote repository tools to gather initial context for investigations.
- Evidence: Execution of
git blame,git log, andgh pr viewto establish the "Code Anchor" in Step 2 ofSKILL.md. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill is designed to aggregate and synthesize sensitive information from across a company's infrastructure and communication tools.
- Evidence: Step 3 of
SKILL.mddirects agents to perform a "full parallel investigation" to ensure "complete coverage," accessing platforms like Datadog, Sentry, Databricks, Slack, and Notion to build a cited rationale.
Audit Metadata