prompt-master
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 14, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions in
skill.mdandbuilder.mddescribe executing shell commands that include unvalidated user input. For example, the commandpython3 prompt_tool.py build "用户描述"passes a user-provided description directly as a shell argument. This presents a command injection risk where an attacker could execute arbitrary system commands by including shell metacharacters (e.g.,;,&&,|) in their input. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is highly susceptible to Indirect Prompt Injection (Category 8) because it is designed to ingest and process untrusted prompt strings from users to extract features or optimize content.
- Ingestion points: User-provided prompts are processed in
extractor.mdfor feature extraction,optimizer.mdfor enhancement, andlearner.mdfor discovery of new attributes. - Boundary markers: The analysis of
skill.mdand related modules reveals no use of delimiters (e.g., XML tags, triple quotes) or explicit instructions to the agent to ignore instructions embedded within the processed data. - Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to execute local shell commands (
prompt_tool.py) and perform file system operations (read/write JSON libraries in/Users/huangzongning/prompt_gen_image/). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of input validation, escaping, or sanitization of the user-supplied prompt strings before they are processed by the tool logic or passed to LLM calls in the learner module.
Audit Metadata