make-latex-model
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 27, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external, potentially untrusted documents to guide its optimization logic.
- Ingestion points:
scripts/analyze_pdf.pyandscripts/extract_headings.pyingest content from PDF and Word files. - Boundary markers: Missing in
prompts/analysis_template.txt. Extracted content is directly interpolated into prompts using$variableswithout clear delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands. - Capability inventory:
scripts/core/parameter_executor.pymodifies.texfiles using regex, and multiple scripts execute subprocesses likexelatex. - Sanitization: There is no visible sanitization of text extracted from baseline documents before it is presented to the AI for reasoning in
DecisionReasoner. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on executing various system commands and local scripts.
- Subprocess usage: Scripts like
enhanced_optimize.py,optimize.py, andrun_ai_optimizer.pyusesubprocess.runto call LaTeX compilers (xelatex), PDF utilities (qlmanage), and office applications (sofficefor LibreOffice, AppleScript for MS Word). - Safety controls: Project paths are resolved via
WorkspaceManager._resolve_project_path, which verifies that paths are relative to a designatedprojects/root, providing a basic level of protection against path traversal attacks.
Audit Metadata