research-idea
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 27, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Several Python management scripts (
scripts/start_workflow.py,scripts/phase_entry.py,scripts/init_workspace.py) utilizesubprocess.runto execute system commands. scripts/init_workspace.pyexecutesgitcommands to retrieve repository metadata and branch names for automated report naming.scripts/phase_entry.pyandscripts/start_workflow.pyexecutebensz_skill_kernel.cliviasys.executableto manage state transitions, verifier gates, and workspace initialization.- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process potentially untrusted external content.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads user-provided project backgrounds, experimental data, paper drafts, and external literature retrieved from URLs or via the
research-literature-searchdependency. - Boundary markers: Instructions delegate much of the processing to sub-agents (
research-literature-interpretation). While they mention desensitizing summaries, there is a lack of explicit, consistent XML/delimitated boundary markers in the primary instructions for raw data interpolation. - Capability inventory: The skill possesses file system write capabilities (for reports and workspace state) and executes shell commands via management scripts.
- Sanitization:
scripts/init_workspace.pyimplements asanitizefunction usingunicodedata.normalize("NFKC")and regex filters to prevent directory traversal or command injection via repository/PR names used in output paths.
Audit Metadata