skills/huangzida/skills/docx/Gen Agent Trust Hub

docx

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 6, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script scripts/office/soffice.py writes C source code to a temporary file at runtime and compiles it using gcc into a shared library (.so).
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The compiled shared library is injected into the LibreOffice process using the LD_PRELOAD environment variable. This is used to shim socket-related system calls (socket, listen, accept) to bypass environment restrictions in sandboxed containers.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to parse and extract text from external Word documents using tools like pandoc. This content is then provided to the agent's context, potentially allowing instructions within a document to influence agent behavior.
  • Ingestion points: SKILL.md (Read/analyze content tasks).
  • Boundary markers: Instructions do not explicitly specify the use of delimiters when reading external content.
  • Capability inventory: The skill can execute shell commands (soffice, pandoc, git) and perform file system operations (via scripts/accept_changes.py, office/soffice.py, office/validators/redlining.py).
  • Sanitization: The scripts use defusedxml for XML parsing which prevents XML External Entity (XXE) attacks, but does not sanitize potential prompt injection content within the documents themselves.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Oct 6, 2026, 04:20 PM