docx
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 6, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/office/soffice.pywrites C source code to a temporary file at runtime and compiles it usinggccinto a shared library (.so). - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The compiled shared library is injected into the LibreOffice process using the
LD_PRELOADenvironment variable. This is used to shim socket-related system calls (socket,listen,accept) to bypass environment restrictions in sandboxed containers. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to parse and extract text from external Word documents using tools like
pandoc. This content is then provided to the agent's context, potentially allowing instructions within a document to influence agent behavior. - Ingestion points:
SKILL.md(Read/analyze content tasks). - Boundary markers: Instructions do not explicitly specify the use of delimiters when reading external content.
- Capability inventory: The skill can execute shell commands (
soffice,pandoc,git) and perform file system operations (viascripts/accept_changes.py,office/soffice.py,office/validators/redlining.py). - Sanitization: The scripts use
defusedxmlfor XML parsing which prevents XML External Entity (XXE) attacks, but does not sanitize potential prompt injection content within the documents themselves.
Audit Metadata